‘Testing the validity of the “value of a prevented fatality” (VPF) used to assess UK safety measures’: Reply to the comments of Chilton, Covey, Jones-Lee, Loomes, Pidgeon and Spencer  by Thomas, P.J. & Vaughan, G.J.
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eply to the Letter to the EditorWe  have pointed out the apparent misunderstandings in ourTesting the validity of the “value of a prevented fatality” (VPF)
sed  to assess UK safety measures’: Reply to the comments
f  Chilton, Covey, Jones-Lee, Loomes, Pidgeon and Spencer
Thomas  and Vaughan (2014) (hereafter “the Article”) drew
ttention  to the weaknesses in the approach underpinning
he “value of a prevented fatality” (VPF) used as a refer-
nce  for health and safety decisions across the UK’s process,
uclear  and other industries, as well as the NHS (Glover and
enderson,  2010). It is important for the UK’s future health and
afety  strategy that the lack of evidence for the VPF should be
ebated  openly in the pages of a learned journal. Hence we are
leased that Chilton, Covey, Jones-Lee, Loomes, Pidgeon and
pencer,  authors from the Carthy study (Carthy et al., 1999),
ave  attempted to answer our criticisms and that we have
een  given the opportunity to respond.
Having studied the comments provided by Chilton et al., we
elieve  that our signiﬁcant reservations concerning the Carthy
tudy  and its methods remain entirely valid. We  ﬁnd encour-
gement  in the several admissions by Chilton et al. that our
riticisms  are justiﬁed.
A  major problem for the Carthy chained approach is the
igniﬁcant deviation between direct and indirect measure-
ents  of the same quantity, which common sense suggests
hould  not occur. Two “values of a prevented injury” (VPI) per
ndividual  can be calculated for one speciﬁed serious but non-
atal  injury cited in the Carthy study, with one personal VPI,
(1)
Xi
, calculated directly and the other, m(2)
Xi
through two-injury
haining. The two ﬁgures should be the same or similar, but
hey  turn out to be completely different. Moreover, there is
arely  any correlation between the two in the 167-strong sam-
le.
We  are pleased that Chilton et al. acknowledge this in their
Concluding comments”:
“there  is a deﬁnite and seemingly systematic divergence
between direct and indirect estimates which is illustrated
by  the comparison between m(2)
Xi
and m(1)
Xi
.”
Chilton  et al. highlight the useful contributions of the
arthy  study as:
DOI of original article:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.11.002.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.(i) “providing evidence which, when blended with judge-
ment, helped consolidate the VPF”, and
(ii) “demonstrating the need and potential for further work to
improve  the methodology of stated preference elicitation
in  respects where limitations still undoubtedly exist.”
and  request that their study should not be regarded as
“worthless”.
Against  that must be set the fact that the two-injury
chained method has failed its validation test. Moreover,
Chilton et al. admit applying their own judgement in deriv-
ing  the ﬁnal VPF value, with the decision space over which
their  judgement ranged being very large – between £0.5 M and
£1.6  M even near the end of the study, for example. No route
can  be traced from the opinions of the respondents to the
recommended VPF ﬁgure without it passing ﬁrst through the
ﬁlter  of the Carthy authors’ judgement. The VPF ﬁgure they
advance  is thus not an objective consolidation of the views of
the  respondents and must be regarded as compromised and
unreliable  as a result.
Moreover  neither the Carthy study nor Chilton et al. have
put  forward evidence to show that the wealth of the 167
respondents reﬂected the range of personal wealths in the
nation.  Furthermore it will be shown in the reply to the com-
ments  on Section 4 of the Article that Chilton et al. have been
unable  to sustain a valid objection to the Article’s ﬁndings on
the  apparently very low levels of wealth in the sample. Were
the  methods of the Carthy study correct and consistent, the
average  wealth of the respondents would have been less than
a  tenth of the average net wealth of UK adults in 1997. Hence
no  trust could have been put in the VPF emerging from the
Carthy  study, even if its underlying method had not failed its
validation  test.
There  is no evidential base for the VPF recommended by
the  Carthy study grounded in the opinions of a representative
set  of respondents and hence no evidential basis for the UK’s
VPF.
Many  of the comments of Chilton et al. on Sections 1, 2,
4  of the Article have been found to be ﬂawed or mistaken.detailed replies, taken Section by Section in the order used by
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largely  of attempts to salvage credibility for the two-injury
chained method in the face of the very signiﬁcant and admit-
ted  disparity between its two measurements of the same
quantity.  In our opinion, credibility has not been achieved.
Reply  to  comments  headed  “TV’s  Section  1:
Introduction”
Chilton et al. (2014) say that the 1997 opinion survey was “not
the  sole basis for the VPF” used in the UK when, by contrast,
Chilton  et al. (2002) seemed to be claiming credit for the Carthy
study:
“In  the light of the ﬁndings in [Beattie et al. (1998) and
Carthy et al. (1999)] the . . . DTER [Department for Trans-
port, Environment and the Regions] elected to increase its
WTP-based  roads VPF to some £1.05 million in 1998 prices.”
Moreover, in their Final Report to the Government’s Inter-
Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health, Wolff
and  Orr (2009) conclude:
“it  appears that the Carthy study is now the primary source
of  VPF ﬁgures, adjusted for inﬂation and changes in GDP.”
The  Spackman report (Spackman et al., 2011) also conﬁrms
that  it is
“the  1997 WTP  study on which the current WTP  values are
based”
making  it clear that the Carthy study and the “1997 WTP  study”
are  synonymous. The Spackman report also explains that the
“WTP  value” (=the Carthy VPF) makes up about 93% of the
DfT’s  VPF, based on the most recently available ﬁgures, with
the  remaining 7% covering medical and ambulance costs and
the  net lost output of the victim.
Chilton et al. (2014) come closer to the mark when they
claim  a “key role” for the Carthy VPF, making it vital that those
responsible  for the UK’s safety policy should know that the
chained  method on which the UK’s VPF rests is invalid.
Chilton et al. object to the Article’s quotation from the
Spackman report, indicating its recommendation “against any
early new full scale WTP  study” and quote both the complete
sentence and the two preceding sentences. It is difﬁcult to see
the  words  as other than a recommendation, but if there was
ever  any doubt, these words are backed up in the report’s “Sec-
tion  8 Conclusions and Recommendations”, subsection “8.5.1.
UK  transport WTP  valuations”:
“Recommendations
There should be no near term full revaluation of the WTP
element  of the VPF or of the VPIs.”
As noted by Chilton et al., the Spackman report also con-
tains  the statement:
“We  conclude that the chained approach is in principle
superior to other stated-preference procedures that have
so  far been used to estimate WTP-based values of fatality
risks.”
If  this statement were  to be believed, then given the analysis
in  the Article and the acceptance by Chilton et al. of the limita-
tions  of the chained approach (“limitations still undoubtedly
exist”), it would seem to raise signiﬁcant issues about the via-
bility  of stated preference methods of any sort.Chilton et al. dispute the following sentence from the Arti-
cle:
“They  introduced the two-injury chained model, where the
response  to a serious injury of the second type, e.g. a fatal
injury,  is deduced after ﬁrst eliciting from the person a
statement of how much  he would spend to reduce the prob-
ability  of a lesser injury of type 1.”
It is a fundamental to the two-injury chained model that, for
every  individual i, the marginal rate of substitution, m1i, of
non-injury  probability for wealth for injury 1 needs to be found
ﬁrst.  Then further questioning is used to establish the ratio of
the  individual’s desired spending to reduce the chances of the
more  serious, type 2 injury to his spending to reduce the prob-
ability  of the type 1 injury. In symbols, m1i is found ﬁrst, the
ratio,  m2i/m1i, is found next, allowing m1i × m2i/m1i to produce,
notionally at least, m2i, the marginal rate of substitution of
non-injury  probability for wealth, wi, for injury 2 for individual
i.
The  complaint of Chilton et al. is that two statements
need to be elicited from individual i before m1i can be calcu-
lated,  rather than just one: he needs to state the maximum
acceptable price (MAP) he is prepared to pay to avert injury 1
and the minimum acceptable compensation (MAC)  he would
require  to make up for his receiving injury 1. This point is
explained  fully by Thomas and Vaughan in the more  exten-
sive  description of the two-injury chained method given in
the  next Section, “Data”, on the next page. Nevertheless it is
accepted that omitting the words, “a statement of” in the dis-
puted  sentence would render it more  accurate, although we
feel  that this is a rather small point of little importance to the
main  criticisms we  have made. And, of course, the two-injury
chained approach is summarised in mathematically precise
terms  in Appendix A of the Article.
Reply  to  comments  headed  “TV’s  Section  2:
Data”
Chilton et al. are mistaken in saying
“34 cases which TV [Thomas and Vaughan (2014)] describe
as  ‘inconsistencies in the results’ are those in which the
respondent’s stated willingness to pay for a complete cure
for  a particular injury (MAP) was  greater than or equal to
the  sum that he/she would be willing to accept in compen-
sation for suffering the injury (MAC).”
since 29 are cases where MAC ≤ MAP, and 5 have MAC > MAP.
Moreover,  the 34 do not include a further 7 respondents with
MAC  ≤ MAP.
Chilton et al. are also in error when they assert that:
“the  Negative Exponential utility function produces a com-
pletely  different result from the one that we  derived and
reported  in the data that we sent to them.”
Table 1 compares the values calculated using the method
described in Appendix B.4 of the Article for the 34 cases where
the  Carthy authors over-write a common value for personal
VPF,  m(2)
Xi
, across all utility functions. It is clear that, with the
exception  of respondent 123, the results are essentially the
same.  They would be exactly the same if the Carthy authors
had  chosen to solve Eqs. (ix) and (x) of their Appendix B using
a  high-precision numerical iterative technique rather than
using  their derived approximations (accurate to about a half a
percent).
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Table 1 – The common value from the Carthy study and the corresponding value from the Negative Exponential utility
function.
Respondent i Xi Personal VPF from 2-part chaining from injury X (£)
Negative Exponential (Thomas and
Vaughan, 2014, Appendix B.4)
Common value Carthy
study
6 0.3820 712,802 713,715
7 0.0724 78,445 78,669
12 0.7796 1,105,436 1,108,890
13 1.0000 19,980,000  19,980,000
24 0.1607 1,375,907 1,390,571
27 0.0724 44,125 44,251
39 0.6544 904,648 912,975
58 0.6106 241,403 242,614
59 0.0164 37,754 37,762
70 0.5547 1,509,739 1,498,500
77 0.8192 2,717,044 2,747,250
85 0.3051 53,704 53,824
86 0.6106 262,858 264,180
88 0.0724 313,778 314,674
91 0.3820 962,283 963,036
97 0.3820 17,164 17,173
99 0.7796 9,024 9,052
100 0.6106 262,858 264,180
107 0.8468 1,342,156 1,348,650
108 2.0000 1,441,252 1,441,357
109 1.6180 160,381 160,589
113 0.1607 280,801 283,790
114 1.0000 5,046 5,045
122 0.2451 297,978 297,480
123 1.7549 446,968 792,540
128 1.0000 499,500 499,500
130 1.0000 50,200 50,201
145 0.7182 34,713 34,557
148 0.0164 19,387 19,391
152 0.3820 12,830,440 12,837,151
161 0.7796 2,210,872 2,217,780
163 0.2451 35,999 35,937
164 1.7549 1,191,914 1,189,920
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Respondent 123 has MAC  > MAP,  contradicting the contrary
uggestion by Chilton et al., so his personal VPF should be as
isted  by Thomas and Vaughan in Table 1.
Table 1 shows also the value of the parameter, Xi, needed
o  solve Eq. (6) of the Article. It may  be noted that when
AC  = MAP,  Xi = 1. From Appendix B.4 of the Article, Xi = eˇixXi
o that ˇi = (ln Xi)/xXi. Since xXi > 0, it follows that ˇi = 0 when
AC  = MAP  and Xi = 1. Such an eventuality is, in fact, pro-
ibited  by Carthy et al. in Eq. (vii) of their Appendix B, but
pparently reinstated in the ﬁrst paragraph of their Section
.3.  Chilton et al. endorse the Carthy reinstatement of ˇi = 0,
aying
“we  applied a linear utility of wealth function whenever
MAP  = MAC”
ut noting the deﬁnition of the Negative Exponential utility
unction:
i(wi) = −e−ˇiwi (1)
nd substituting ˇi = 0 gives:
i(wi) = −1 for all wealths, wi (2)
his does, indeed, give a straight-line graph, but the line is
orizontal,  implying a utility function for wealth that is inde-
endent  of wealth, which is a contradiction in terms. Thus595,957 594,960
ˇi = 0 needs to be excluded, although the Carthy authors did
not  seem to be fully aware of the fact, nor do Chilton et al.
appear  to have realised it.
The situation is, if anything, worse for cases where
MAC  < MAP, since this entails 0 < Xi < 1. Applying.
ˇi = (ln Xi)/xXi with xXi > 0 implies ˇi < 0. Chilton et al. seem
to be under the erroneous impression that this condition
converts the Negative Exponential utility function, concave
when  ˇi > 0, into a convex utility function:
”  a strictly convex, positive exponential utility of wealth
function whenever MAP > MAC.”
Not  so. The exponent, iwi, where i = − ˇi > 0, will be pos-
itive, but the negative sign preceding the exponential will
remain.  In so far as the resulting function can be described
as  a utility function at all, it will remain a Negative Exponen-
tial  utility function. For what it is worth, the new function will
remain  concave (not convex as suggested by Chilton et al.), but
it is inadmissible as a utility function, since it predicts that util-
ity  will decrease monotonically with wealth. See Fig. 1, which
shows  the (improper) Negative Exponential utility function for
respondent 70 from Table 1, who has MAC < MAP.
To summarise, the Carthy study substituted a common
value for personal VPF for 34 respondents across the other
three  utility functions. That common value was  calcu-
lated  from the Negative Exponential utility function using
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Fig. 1 – Negative Exponential utility function with ˇi < 0
(respondent 70).
Ui(wi) =
Fi(wi − ˇ(i)) for wi > ˇ(i)
(7)an  approximate method. The Negative Exponential utility
function  was, however, being operated beyond its range of
legitimacy  whenever MAC  ≤ MAP,  which was  the case for 29
out  of the 34 cases under discussion, even though numer-
ical  results could be generated. The attempted justiﬁcation
offered by Chilton et al. for applying a common personal VPF
derived  from the Negative Exponential utility function across
all  utility functions disappears for the other 5 cases, where
their  assumption that MAC  ≤ MAP  does not hold.
Despite the fact that average VPFs apparently coming
from the Constrained Power, the Logarithmic and the Neg-
ative  Inverse utility functions have a large number of their
constituent, personal VPFs supplied from the Negative Expo-
nential  utility function, no indication of this was  carried in
their  labels. See Tables 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the Carthy study. While
Chilton  et al. have now pointed to the ﬁrst paragraph of Section
3.3  of the Carthy study as a statement that the Carthy authors
chose  to operate in this way,  and this is accepted, neverthe-
less  it is inherently misleading to ﬁle results under the wrong
label:  deliberate misattribution is poor practice. Nor did the
cited  paragraph indicate the large scale of the practice, with
the  average VPFs for the other utility functions carrying a 22%
contribution  from the Negative Exponential utility function.
Such  a large common contribution ought, as a minimum, to
be reﬂected in the labelling of the VPFs, clarifying that the four
utility  function streams are not independent. Thus, for exam-
ple,  the results listed as “Logarithmic” ought to carry the label,
“Logarithmic/Negative Exponential”.
It is not clear why  the Carthy authors resorted to using
results from the Negative Exponential utility function when
the  other utility functions can generate similar results to those
of  the ultra vires Negative Exponential utility function when
they,  too, are pushed beyond their legitimate limits.
But  most of the 34 cases under discussion should have
been  excluded from consideration because of the inability of
the  Carthy method to cope when MAC  ≤ MAP, as should the
additional  7 cases with MAC  ≤ MAP.  The number of respon-
dents  from the sample with which the Carthy method can
cope  reduces to either 120 or 121, depending on the utility
function used, down  by about a quarter on the already low
starting  ﬁgure of 167. Neither Carthy et al. (1999) nor Chilton
et  al. comment on the small sample size, to be considered at
the  end of the next section.Reply  to  comments  headed  “TV’s  Section  4:  The
wealth  of  respondents”
Chilton et al. are in error when they suggest that the wealth
offset,  ˇ, may  take some arbitrary value. If the four utility
functions used in the Carthy study are to measure the same
wealth  characteristic, essential for consistency and compara-
bility,  then the wealth offset, ˇ, must be zero.
The Article gives the Negative Exponential utility function
as:
Ui(wi) = −eˇiwi , ˇi > 0 (B.28)
with the subscript, i, added to identify it with the ith individ-
ual.  Including a wealth offset, ˇ(i), for individual i modiﬁes the
form  of Eq. (B.28) to:
Ui(wi) = −eˇi(wi−ˇ
(i))
ˇi > 0
0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi
(3)
where the condition, 0 ≤ ˇ(i) < wi, is stipulated in the Carthy
study.  Comparing Eqs. (B.28) and (3) shows that
ˇ(i) = 0 for all individuals, i (4)
for the Negative Exponential utility function.
Characterising the four utility functions by
Ui(wi) = Fi(wi − ˇ(i)) (5)
where Fi(·) is an increasing function of its argument. The sec-
ond  condition accompanying Eq. (3) implies
wi − ˇ(i)≥0 (6)
so that the lowest value of utility will occur as wi → ˇ(i). This
implies  that the wealth offset, ˇ(i), is the limiting value of
wealth  that gives the individual his lowest utility, a result
independent of utility function.
While a different numerical value for utility will be
obtained for each of the four utility functions, the wealth the
individual  feels he needs before it brings him any utility, his
wealth  offset, ˇ(i), will be a characteristic of him not of the func-
tion  used to model his utility. Hence the assertion by Chilton
et  al. that
“there is absolutely no reason why the shift parameter, ˇ,
should  be the same in the two cases [Negative Inverse and
Logarithmic]”
is  incorrect. The wealth offset, ˇ(i), being a characteristic of
the  individual, will hold across all utility functions, and since
it  is speciﬁed by the authors of the Carthy study as ˇ(i) = 0 for
all  i for the Negative Exponential utility function, that value,
ˇ(i) = 0, must apply to the other three utility functions.
While the above has proved that ˇ(i) = 0 for all i, a further
comment is appropriate on the lack of realism of a non-zero
ﬁgure  for wealth offset. Suppose that a person possesses a
wealth,  wi = ˇ(i)/2. Condition (6) is now violated, and no utility
can  be found for the person, unless Eq. (5) is replaced with
{
Fi(0+) for wi ≤ ˇ(i)
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shere the argument, 0+, allows the Lognormal and Negative
nverse  utility functions to return a value.
Assuming Eq. (7) holds, a wealth, wi = ˇ(i)/2, will cause
he individual to experience his lowest possible utility. Now
uppose  his wealth increases by 50% to wi = 0.75ˇ(i). Will he
xperience  any beneﬁt? Apparently not. But such a result goes
gainst  normal economic wisdom that, ceteris paribus, more  is
referred to less. It also goes against a basic assumption of
conomic  utility theory, namely diminishing marginal utility
e.g.  Lipsey and Chrystal, 1995). For a person who is risk averse
ut  who  has a positive wealth offset will have a marginal util-
ty  that starts and continues at zero as his wealth increases
owards his wealth offset. His marginal utility will then rise
iscontinuously to its highest value just above the wealth off-
et  and only then undergo the steady decline with wealth that
s  characteristic of diminishing marginal utility.
Considerable doubt is thus cast on the realism of expect-
ng  the wealth offset, ˇ(i), to take any positive value. Certainly
aniel  Bernoulli included no offset when he introduced the
ogarithmic  utility function (Bernoulli, 1738, 1954). Moreover
he  UK Treasury has adopted a Logarithmic utility function
ithout  offset (Treasury, 2011). A positive wealth offset also
iolates  a condition laid down  in the Carthy study:
“Now suppose that the individual prefers more  wealth
to  less and is ﬁnancially risk-averse so that (∀w)U′(w) >
0,  U′′(w) < 0 where U′′(w), denotes the second derivative of
U(·)”
To  summarise, Chilton et al. have sustained no valid objec-
ion  to the ﬁndings of Section 4 of the Article concerning the
ery  low values of wealth apparently revealed in the Carthy
tudy.
Moreover,  the validity of averaging the personal VPFs to
ive  a nationwide VPF (Eq. (A.36) of the Article) depends crit-
cally  on the sample reﬂecting very closely the probability
ensity for wealth in the nation as a whole, including people
ith  signiﬁcant wealth as well as those with middling and low
ealth. But no evidence has been advanced in the Carthy study
or  in the response by Chilton et al. to show that the wealth
f  the 1997 respondents reﬂected the full range of wealths in
he  UK. It is not even clear that the authors of the Carthy study
ollected  the wealth data needed to justify a survey-based VPF.
It is doubtful that 167 people, still less the 120 for whom per-
onal  VPFs could reasonably be computed, would be enough
o  represent adequately the full spread of wealths in the UK.
eply  to  comments  headed  “TV’s  Section  3:
esting the  validity  of  the  two-injury  chained
ethod”
hilton et al. object to the clause, “the degree of linear correla-
ion  is almost non-existent”, although the rest of the sentence
eﬁnes  what is meant in numerical terms:
“Moreover, the degree of linear correlation is almost non-
existent:  while the square of the correlation coefﬁcient,
R2 should obey R2 = 1.0 or be close, the actual value is
R2 = 0.0719.” (The Article)
ven though they themselves describe it as “quite weak” in
heir  next paragraph, the contention from Chilton et al. seems
o  be that the degree of linear correlation cannot be “almost
on-existent” when some degree of positive correlation is
ikely.  It is important to address this statistical misunder-
tanding.What  may  be described as the “scatter plot” of Fig. 2 of
the  Article is based on the Constrained Power utility function,
where  the value of R2 is 0.0719 ⇒ R = 0.268. Given the high num-
ber  of data points on the graph, such a value of R is indeed
unlikely to be the chance outcome of an uncorrelated process.
However,  the degree of correlation will be very low indeed, in
the sense that only 7.19% of the variation in the m(2)
Xi
values
can  be attributed to the best linear relationship with the m(1)
Xi
values, while 92.81% will be associated with other, unidenti-
ﬁed  factors. Similar scatter plots arise from the Logarithmic
and  Negative Inverse utility functions. In both these cases the
correlation  coefﬁcient is high enough to indicate some degree
of  correlation, but the amount of variation in the m(2)
Xi
values
that  can be attributed to the linear relationship with the m(1)
Xi
values is 4.43% under the Logarithmic utility function and just
1.95%  for the Negative Inverse utility function. A scatter plot is
also possible based on the Negative Exponential utility func-
tion,  but now there is a good chance (>5%) that the observed
correlation, R = 0.089, is consistent with a real value R = 0. Even
if  the correlation did exist, it would account for less than 1%
of  the observed variation in m(2)
Xi
. Thus the degree of linear cor-
relation  between m(2)
Xi
and m(1)
Xi
is extremely low, irrespective of
which  utility function is used, as stated in the Article.
Chilton et al. do not dispute that there is a signiﬁcant dis-
parity  between the two VPI values for each individual. But in
their  desire to restate the discrepancy so that it looks bet-
ter,  they resort to the data censoring that was  characteristic
of  the Carthy study. This time respondent 43 is to have his
views  disregarded in addition to respondent 51, whose views
were  censored in the Carthy study. Then, if “just these two
observations are set to one side”, as Chilton et al. put it, the
regression  slope falls from 8.24 to 3.27. No justiﬁcation is given
for  disregarding the views of respondents 43 and 51 beyond the
convenience  that dropping respondents associated with high
m
(2)
Xi
values reduces the apparent disparity.
Of course a slope of 3.27 when it should be 1.0 is still a major
discrepancy, and the next argument of Chilton et al. is that if
the VPI for the same injury is found for the same person in two
different  ways, the two VPI values should no longer be required
to  be the same. Hence rather than expressing the requirement
mathematically as:
m
(2)
Xi
= m(1)
Xi
(8)
as suggested the Article, Chilton et al. suggest instead
m
(2)
Xi
= f (m(1)
Xi
) (9)
where f(·) is a nonlinear function such that
f (m(1)
Xi
) /=  m(1)
Xi
(10)
According to Chilton et al.:
“The truth is that the relationship is much  better described
as  nonlinear”
despite this view seeming to go against what they wrote just
three  paragraphs before:
“In theory, for a respondent with error-free deterministic
preferences, these two estimates would be identical, or at
least  very similar.”
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1This sentence is noteworthy in its own right for its attempt
to  pass onto the respondent the responsibility for any dis-
crepancies  between his two very different VPIs for the same
injury.  According to Chilton et al., it is not the measurement
processes that are getting it wrong, rather these are accurate,
but  the respondent keeps changing his mind and making mis-
takes.  This idea seems to be another unjustiﬁed judgement
on  the part of the researchers, and lies behind their frequent
use  of the word  “deterministic” as a disclaimer. It would be
interesting  to know what evidence there is for a person’s deep
feelings  on serious injury changing greatly in the 30–60 min  of
his  or her interview.
It  is difﬁcult to dismiss the possibility that a new measure-
ment  and ﬁltering method based on complicated theory might
fare  badly when put into practice and, surprisingly, the break-
down  of the chained method in practice appears to be the
next  argument advanced by Chilton et al. They devote para-
graphs  6–15 of their Section headed “TV’s Section 3: Testing
the  validity of the two-injury chained method” to an attempt
to  demonstrate that the more  direct, m(1)
Xi
, estimate of the
VPI  is likely to be more  reliable than the version, m(2)
Xi
, found
through  two-part chaining. Intriguingly, they base part of their
argument on the answers provided by respondent 51, whose
opinion  they suggested dismissing two paragraphs earlier, and
whose  views were  indeed censored in the Carthy study, but
whose  opinion is now sufﬁciently typical to be used as an
exemplar.
Broadly,  Chilton et al. claim that the hospitalisation and the
recovery  period for injury X are each 4–5 times longer than for
injury  W (actual ratios: 4.67–7.0 hospitalisation; 4.5–6.0 recov-
ery)  and that they would expect individual VPI ratios for the
two  injuries to conform to these ratios. Although not quoted by
Chilton et al., the large sample standard deviation, 2.52, gives
some  appreciation of the high degree of scatter on the sample
mean,  3.8, of the VPI ratio under the Constrained Power util-
ity  function. On the basis that 3.8 should be regarded as close
to  the ranges (although actually lying outside them), Chilton
et  al. suggest that m(1)
Xi
is likely to be a fair estimate of the
personal VPI for injury X.
Examining this claim further, by deﬁnition
m
(1)
Xi
= m
(1)
Xi
mWi
mWi =  WimWi (11)
Now approximate  Wi by the mean VPI ratio:
 Wi =
m
(1)
Xi
mWi
≈
(
m
(1)
Xi
mWi
)
(12)
Since the average ratio, m(1)
Xi
/mWi, seems to conform very
roughly to a linear model of the periods of hospitalisation
and recovery, and mWi is also assumed to be about right, then,
goes  the apparent argument, m(1)
Xi
will be roughly correct. (The
very  large scatter on the individual values of m(1)
Xi
/mWi suggests
signiﬁcant problems with this reasoning.)
Having attempted to show that m(1)
Xi
is relatively depend-
able, Chilton et al. seek now to establish that m(2)
Xi
is a poorestimate of the personal VPI for injury X. They say that m(2)
Xi
values are problematic because:Fig. 2 – Histogram of the standard-gamble probabilities.
“SG [standard-gamble] responses are liable to produce
much  higher ‘multiples of badness’ factors than MAC  and
MAP  responses.”
The  calculational route to obtaining m(2)
Xi
via “chaining” may
be  expressed mathematically as:
m
(2)
Xi
= WimWi (13)
with the standard-gamble multiplier, Wi, for the individual
given by:
Wi =
1  − W
˘Wi − W
(14)
where the respondent chooses the standard-gamble proba-
bility,  ˘Wi, for the failure probability of an operation with a
potentially  better outcome than the reference operation which
has  a failure probability, W = 0.01. Fig. 2 gives a histogram of
probabilities  chosen. Chilton et al. note that
“small perturbations among low SG responses can result in
very  substantial effects on the multipliers.”
which may  be veriﬁed easily by differentiation. This feature
is  regarded as producing “strong asymmetries”, in the sense
that  equal differences, ˘Wi, in standard-gamble probability
will  lead to unequal differences, Wi, in the standard-gamble
multiplier. They inveigh against the high number of large
“badness  multiples”, Wi, resulting from the standard-gamble
calculation as compared with the much  lower number of large
ratios,   Wi = m(1)Xi /mWi calculated from the “direct” VPIs:
“whereas there were only ﬁve individuals exhibiting a
m
(1)
Xi
/mWi ratio greater than 10, there are sixty-ﬁve whose
SG  responses entail badness multiples greater than 10”
(These  are essentially the respondents making up the mode
in  Fig. 2) A little later they conclude that
“We suggest that it is the multiplication of the mWi ﬁg-
ures by an inverse function of small SG probabilities that is
mainly  responsible for the nonlinear departure of m(2)
Xi
from
m
(1)
Xi
.”
In fact, replacing the standard-gamble multiplier with a
term  linearly decreasing in standard-gamble probability, ˘Wi,
would  lead to equal differences in standard-gamble probabil-
ity  producing equal differences in standard-gamble multiplier,
as  desired Chilton et al., but what would be the justiﬁcation?Given that it is integral to the chained method, it is surpris-
ing  that Chilton et al. have argued that the standard-gamble
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Pre-existing VPFultiplier becomes unworkable when faced with the opinions
f  real people (“in the real world of stated preference sur-
eys”).  They suggest that some questions, such as choosing
he  standard-gamble probability, ˘Wi, are “vulnerable to noise,
rror  or bias”.
Chilton et al. concede ﬁnally:
“This is undoubtedly a problem for the use of the chained
approach”
hey  follow this up with a request that their 1997 study should
ot  be regarded as worthless and that “some understanding
or the nature of the problem” should be shown.
But for the two-injury chaining method to provide a credi-
le  ﬁgure for the VPF, two techniques need to work correctly:
(i)  that for ﬁnding a person’s VPI based on his MAC and MAP
(the  “direct” method)
ii)  that of “chaining” from the VPI to the VPF using the
standard-gamble multiplier.
ince  the directly derived VPI ﬁgures for injuries W and X
re  regarded by Chilton et al. as fair, if the VPI for X found
y  chaining from W is very different from the direct version,
hich  it is, the chained VPI must be wrong, with the fault lying
n  the chaining process and the standard gamble multiplier,
ccording to the logic of Chilton et al.
If all that was  at stake were the VPI for injury X, then a
atisfactory substantiation of m(1)
Xi
would be sufﬁcient. But the
arthy  study is based on the premise that the VPF ﬁgure, m(1)
Di
,
annot  be derived directly. Reliance must therefore be placed
n  the chained VPF, m(2)
Xi
, found by multiplying m(1)
Xi
by the
tandard-gamble multiplier. But if the latter is unreliable or
rong,  no reliance can be placed on the individuals’ chained
PFs,  m(2)
Xi
, nor on the consolidated VPF taken as an average of
he  individual ﬁgures.
In  summary, the Carthy VPF can be regarded as valid only
y  ignoring the failure of the chaining method in its validation
est,  which runs counter to the philosophy and practice of
cience  (Popper, 1934).
eply  to  comments  headed  “TV’s  Section  7:
ensoring the  data”
hilton et al. propose a new argument. Since the average ratio
f  the chained VPI to the direct version, m(2)
Xi
/m
(1)
Xi
, is very
igh (a factor of about 6, although note the huge standard devi-
tion  of 15, Table 3 of the Article) and since m(1)
Xi
is judged by
hilton  et al. to be a fair ﬁgure, then the average chained VPI,
m
(2)
Xi
, will be too high, and, by analogy, the average, chained
PF, m(2)
Di
, will be too big also. Therefore, apparently, the ana-
yst  should be given the freedom to reduce m(1)
Di
through
ensoring and the application of his judgement. One way  is
o  “trim out” some of the highest personal, chained VPFs.
nother is to adopt the median in preference to the mean.
According to Chilton et al., the analyst can compensate for
he  poor performance of the two-injury chained method as
ong  as he can make the right “judgement calls”. They concede
hat“It  is true that the details of some of the judgment calls in
Carthy  et al. (1999) are not spelled out as clearly as theyFig. 3 – The 39 steps to the VPF.
might have been and it is fair for TV to draw attention to
this.”
The  Article explains that when the distribution of personal
VPFs  is approximately lognormal with a large spread, an
analyst  who feels free to choose either the mean or the median
or  some combination will have huge leeway for applying
judgement to interpret his results. The range of VPF ﬁgures
over  which the Carthy authors felt free to judge was  enormous,
from  £120,000 to £33,000,000, as shown in Fig. 3. VPFs of £0.5 M
and  £1.6 M were  still under discussion in the 3rd last para-
graph  of the “Concluding comments” of the Carthy study. 39
steps  were  needed before the Carthy authors closed on their
ﬁnal  judgement of £1,000,000, a VPF described by Wolff and
Orr  (2009) as “very close to the existing one”, then £902,500.
While  censoring Respondent 132’s view was  shown in the
Article  to be untenable because it was not an outlier, Chilton
et  al. now suggest that the high personal VPF of Respondent
132  might have arisen from a transcription error. The value of
his  standard-gamble probability, ˘X132, might not have been
0.0011,  as recorded, but 0.0015 instead:
“There is one case for which the multiplier is shown on our
spreadsheet as 9990, which might have been the result of
an  error in entering data: we assign that case a multiplier
of  1998 instead”
No  justiﬁcation seems to accompany this new suggestion, sur-
facing  17 years after the Carthy study was carried out, but it
effect  is to reduce the personal VPF of Respondent 132 by a
factor  of ﬁve.
Chilton  et al. say “TV may  be reluctant to engage in trim-
ming”  as if censoring data or not was  a matter of personal
preference. This is perhaps the strangest aspect of their
“defence”. In effect, they are saying that their judgement is
better  than the data. But as a general point, once procedural
errors such as mistakes in transcription have been corrected,
there  is no justiﬁcation for rejecting a view from an opinion
survey  or according it a reduced weighting simply because it
differs signiﬁcantly from the rest. Such a procedure would be
defensible only if it could be proved that the person concerned
was  unqualiﬁed to offer an opinion.The issue is analysed in Thomas (2014), which shows that,
when  seeking to consolidate people’s views on the size of a
306  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 299–306numerical quantity, the analyst cannot defend himself against
a  charge of lack of objectivity if he uses a consolidation method
that  violates the criterion of structural view independence.
The sample mean satisﬁes the criterion but “trimmed means”
do  not.
Reply  to  comments  headed  “Our  concluding
comments”
Chilton et al. concede that
“there is a deﬁnite and seemingly systematic divergence
between direct and indirect estimates which is illustrated
by  the comparison between m(2)
Xi
and m(1)
Xi
.”
Requesting  again that the Carthy study should not be regarded
as  “worthless”, they suggest that the useful contribution of the
Carthy  study lies predominantly in:
(i) “providing evidence which, when blended with judge-
ment,  helped consolidate the VPF”, and
(ii) “demonstrating the need and potential for further work to
improve  the methodology of stated preference elicitation
in  respects where limitations still undoubtedly exist.”
Claim  (i) contains an admission by Chilton et al. that their
recommended VPF was  reliant on the exercise of their own
judgement.
Claim  (ii) contains a welcome acknowledgement by Chilton
et  al. of their method’s limitations.
The views of Chilton et al. on the limitations of stated pref-
erence  techniques in general are also of interest.
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